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 Chapter 3 
 The Drivers of Global Value Chain 
Participation: Cross-Country Analyses 
 Building on the work of Jones and Kierzkowski ( 1990 ), economists have been 
 writing models that describe how fi rms are increasingly fragmenting production 
processes into various stages or tasks and moving them to more advantageous loca-
tions (e.g., Deardorff,  2001a ,  2001b ; Findlay & Jones,  2001 ; Grossman & Rossi- 
Hansberg,  2008 ; Jones & Kierzkowski,  2000 ,  2001 ). Most of the models in this 
literature draw on fi ndings from an earlier literature on FDI, namely that fi rms will 
fragment production or tasks across different countries to arbitrage international 
differences in factor prices (Helpman,  1984 ; Helpman & Krugman,  1985 ). 1 
The rationale behind most models of fragmentation can be stated in simple terms: 
in traditional production processes, inputs are organized and combined to generate 
fi nal outputs in the same location. Where there are many inputs, coordination is 
normally necessary and proximity helps to lower the costs of coordination and 
transportation. But if fi rms could separate the production process into different 
 production blocks and relocate them in places with lower factor prices, the total 
costs of production could be further reduced. Therefore fi rms will unbundle their 
production processes, as long as the resulting reduction in production costs would 
more than compensate for the additional costs of coordinating remotely located 
production blocks and moving these production blocks around. 
1
  This class of models, called the vertical model of FDI, was developed in parallel with the horizon-
tal model of FDI. In the latter model, the motive behind the multinational corporation (MNC) is to 
save on trade costs associated with exporting by setting up foreign subsidiaries producing similar 
goods to those produced at home (Horstmann & Markusen,  1987 ; Markusen,  1984 ). Later on, the 
knowledge-capital model was developed, which allowed for simultaneous horizontal and vertical 
motives for FDI (Markusen,  1997 ). The new models of fragmentation are generally not exclusively 
limited to the study of multinationals. The main predictions of these new models tend to apply to 
companies that fragment production internationally, regardless of whether this is done within the 
boundaries of the fi rm or through independent suppliers. Another strand of the literature examines 
the more specifi c issue of whether the fragmentation of production occurs within the boundaries of 
the fi rm or through an independent supplier (Antràs,  2003 ; Antràs & Helpman,  2004 ,   2008 ). This 
is called the internalization decision. 
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 This model highlights the main forces behind the international unbundling of 
production: on the one hand, there are comparative advantage considerations, such 
as differences in factor prices that make offshoring attractive. But on the other hand, 
additional costs related to offshoring need to be factored in. Therefore, the unbun-
dling of production will take place if the lower marginal costs of production more 
than offset these extra costs related to offshoring. 2 
 This reasoning helps explain why some countries, such as China, are attractive 
destinations for offshoring: when the marginal costs of production are very low they 
almost always compensate for the extra costs related to offshoring. By the same 
token, however, countries with mid- to high-factor prices have a greater need to 
avoid the extra costs of offshoring to become attractive destinations. 
 Different offshoring costs have been highlighted in the literature. For instance, 
high transportation costs are likely to discourage the movement of intermediate 
inputs between countries. Similarly, inadequate telecommunication services would 
make it harder for a fi rm to coordinate with production units located abroad (Jones 
& Kierzkowski,  1990 ). In addition, tariff barriers and costly custom clearances will 
drive up the prices of imported inputs, especially if they cross international borders 
many times. Finally, high costs of dealing with legal procedures in another country 
in the event of a breach of contract would likely limit offshoring decisions in that 
country (Jones & Kierzkowski,  2001 ). As shown in Chap.  1 , many of these obsta-
cles have been declining in recent years. 
 In this chapter we analyze the impact of reducing some of these costs on offshor-
ing decisions. The aim is to identify potential avenues by which countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean could improve their participation in production net-
works. To add nuance to the analysis, the discussion is divided into four sections. 
The fi rst section looks at the role of transportation and logistics services, including 
communication and information technology. The second section analyzes the 
impact of trade agreements and trade policy in general. In the third section we 
examine the factors behind the decision to fragment production through vertical 
FDI versus foreign outsourcing, which naturally leads to the subject of contract 
enforcement. Finally, section “ Service Offshoring: Grasping the Intangibles ” stud-
ies the determinants of service offshoring. As mentioned in the introduction, the list 
of potential drivers behind the formation of global supply chains can be quite exten-
sive. In this chapter we look into areas that seem most relevant in terms of insights 
contained in the literature and opportunities for public policy solutions. 3 
2
  There is a parallel and infl uential literature on GVCs that depend less on general or partial equi-
librium economic models and more on the typologies of linkages in GVCs and the characteristics 
of the units that participate in them (see, for instance, Gereffi ,  1999 ; Gereffi , Humphrey, & 
Sturgeon,  2005 ; Humphrey & Schmitz,  2000 ). In this literature the analysis is mostly focused on 
the governance dimension of the value chain. In other words, central to this literature is the study 
of power relations across the units of the value chains and how these relations affect issues such as 
transfer of knowledge or learning. We will address some of these aspects in Chap.  4 of this report. 
3
  In the next chapter we take a much closer look at the issue of the supplier’s capabilities. 
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 Each section presents recent relevant empirical studies that address specifi c 
issues behind the drivers of offshoring. While each model is tailored to the  particular 
determinant being addressed, they are all estimated in ways that control for other 
elements that may impact offshoring decisions. 
 Synchronizing Trade: The Role of Transportation, 
Communication, and Logistics Infrastructure 
 Firms that fragment production internationally incur risks. One is the possibility of 
delays in the arrival of components, which can result in shutting down entire pro-
duction lines until the necessary inputs have arrived. Firms can address this uncer-
tainty by maintaining large inventories of components. However, modern supply 
chain practices are increasingly moving towards so-called “lean production” strate-
gies, which involve keeping low inventories to cut costs. Accordingly, fi rms frag-
menting production internationally are likely to look for locations with adequate 
transport and logistics infrastructure to reduce disruptions in the supply chain, 
inventory-holding costs, depreciation costs, and handling costs. In this section 
we present empirical evidence on the link between logistics infrastructure and the 
international location of fragmented production. The objective is to measure the 
extent to which defi ciencies in Latin America’s logistics infrastructure are standing 
in the way of the region’s greater participation in global supply chains. 
 We will begin by comparing Latin America with other regions in terms of logis-
tics infrastructure indicators that measure three dimensions relevant for the location 
of fragmented production. The fi rst two dimensions are the quality of the port and 
airport infrastructures; improvements in these facilities are associated with declines 
in transport costs, waiting times, and handling costs (Clark, Dollar, & Micco,  2004 ; 
Limão & Venables,  2002 ; Micco & Serebrisky,  2006 ). Accordingly, countries with 
adequate port and airport infrastructures should be attractive locations for compa-
nies seeking to locate part of their production processes abroad while minimizing 
transportation costs and potential disruptions in the supply chain. 
 The third infrastructure dimension that we examine is the logistics required to 
coordinate production across space. As mentioned in Chap.  1 , information and 
communication technology (ICT) infrastructure is crucial for providing fi rms the 
ability to move information over long distances quickly, cheaply, and reliably, 
and in this way lower the costs of coordinating production blocks across borders. 
The development of readily available and good quality ICT is needed to provide 
instant access to information for the numerous stakeholders in a global value chain, 
e- commerce for consumers, and logistics management. Therefore, countries need 
adequate ICT infrastructures to be attractive destinations for fi rms fragmenting 
 production internationally. 
 Detailed data on port and airport effi ciency are hard to fi nd. In this chapter we 
use a combination of hard data and survey indicators for our estimations. First, we 
obtain hard micro data on port and airport characteristics to construct hard measures 
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of port and airport availability at the country level. Following Clark et al. ( 2004 ), 
we use this data to construct a measure of seaport infrastructure that captures the 
country’s ports that have adequate leverage capacity. 4 Similarly, following Micco 
and Serebrisky ( 2006 ), we construct a measure of the availability of airports with 
runways capable of serving the air cargo industry. 5 With respect to communications, 
we combine a series of hard indicators utilizing the core measures on ICT infra-
structure suggested by The Partnership on Measuring ICT for Development. 6 , 7 As 
mentioned above, we combine these hard data indicators with survey data from the 
Global Competitiveness Index, 2011, of the World Economic Forum. Specifi cally, 
we employ the “quality of port infrastructure,” the “quality of air transport infra-
structure,” and the “quality of ICT infrastructure” indexes. We then normalize each 
of the hard data and survey indicators to take values between 1 and 100. 
 Figure  3.1 compares the average of each of these indexes for the Latin American 
region, the EU, and Asia. The results speak for themselves. LAC, on average, clearly 
has less adequate logistics infrastructure (port, airport, and ICT infrastructure) than 
the other two regions, regardless of which measure we use. 8 The relevant question 
then becomes the extent to which these shortcomings in logistics infrastructure 
reduce Latin America’s ability to attract fragmented production.
 We examine this question by performing an analysis of global data on multination-
als using the Worldbase dataset that we introduced in Chap.  2 . In our analysis we 
assess whether countries with inadequate logistics systems attract fewer vertical affi li-
ates. We start by showing a very simple association between the share of countries’ 
4
  Our port infrastructure variable consists of the number of ports in the country that have lifts with 
leverage capacity of at least 50 tons (squared), normalized by the country’s population. The data 
on port characteristics come from the World Port Index, 2011, prepared by the US National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. In an alternative version we normalized by using the country’s 
employment, which yielded similar results. 
5
  The measure consists of the number of airports with paved runways at least 2,000 m long and 
40 m wide (squared), divided by the population of the country. This choice of runway dimension 
is based on the minimum requirements of aircraft typically used in the air cargo industry (see 
Micco & Serebrisky,  2006 ). The data on airport characteristics come from the ST3400 Database, 
2011, of Sandel Avionics. In an alternative version we normalized by the country’s employment, 
which yielded similar results. 
6
  This partnership was created in 2003 by ITU, OECD, UNCTAD, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
UNECA, UNECLAC, UNESCAP, UNESCWA, the UN ICT Task Force, and the World Bank, to 
work towards defi ning and collecting a set of common ICT indicators and assisting developing 
countries in their efforts to produce information statistics. The data come from the ITU World 
Telecommunication/ICT Indicators 2011. 
7
  The core indicators are fi xed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, mobile cellular telephone sub-
scriptions per 100 inhabitants, terrestrial mobile wireless subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, dedi-
cated mobile data subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, fi xed (wired) Internet subscriptions per 100 
inhabitants, fi xed (wired) broadband Internet subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, and the interna-
tional Internet bandwidth per Internet user. 
8
  This is not a new result. Evidence that countries in LAC have lower port and airport productivity 
measures than other regions has been shown, for example, in Moreira, Volpe, and Blyde ( 2008 ) and 
Pages ( 2010 ). 
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vertical affi liates and the quality of their logistics infrastructure. For the latter we fi rst 
create sub-indexes that combine the hard data and the survey data for each of the three 
infrastructure dimensions, and then we take the average of these three sub-indexes. 9 
Figure  3.2 divides the countries in the sample into four groups (or quartiles) according 
to the quality of their logistics infrastructure. The fi rst quartile corresponds to the coun-
tries with the least adequate logistics infrastructure, and the fourth quartile corresponds 
to the countries with the best quality infrastructure. It is immediately clear that the 
higher the quality of logistics infrastructure, the larger the share of vertical affi liates. 
For instance, the countries in the fourth quartile have 75 % of the vertical affi liates in 
the entire sample, while the countries in the fi rst quartile have less than 1 %.
 We can gain further insights by examining the dependence of industries on good 
logistics services. We can see, for example, that some industries are more sensitive 
to shipping times than others (Hummels & Schaur,  2012 ), particularly for the 
9
  We create a port infrastructure index that consists of the average of the port measure constructed 
with the hard data and the port measure constructed with the survey information after each measure 
is normalized to take values from 1 to 100. Similarly, an airport infrastructure index and an ICT 
infrastructure index are constructed by combining their corresponding hard data and survey 
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 Fig. 3.1  Measures of logistics infrastructure, effi ciency indexes, 2012.  Source : Authors’ calculations 
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 movement of intermediate inputs in a global supply chain. For example, a major 
challenge for a supply chain for computer components is their rapid depreciation; 
therefore, components in such production networks must move rapidly along the 
chain, which requires logistics systems that can handle fast deliveries. A recent 
study on offshoring found that rapid supply of local markets was the most important 
decision driver in the development of a manufacturing sourcing strategy in the con-
sumer electronics industry (Hackett Group,  2012 ). According to the study, highly 
dynamic industries with short product life cycles and high levels of demand vari-
ability base their decisions about where to locate on the quality of transportation and 
logistics. However, the study found that rapid delivery of components is much less 
important in the supply chains of less dynamic but highly price-sensitive industries, 
such as furniture manufacturing. For these industries, raw material and component 
costs are much more important factors driving the location decision than the quality 
of the logistics infrastructure. 
 To proxy for the dependence of the industry on logistics services, we employ a 
measure of industry sensitivity to shipping times constructed by Hummels and Schaur 
( 2012 ). The rationale is the idea that rapid delivery requires good logistics infrastruc-
ture; therefore, industries that are sensitive to shipping times are also  sensitive to 
good logistics services. The measure is based on the premium for air shipping that 
fi rms in an industry are willing to pay to avoid an additional day of ocean transport. 10 
It is interesting to note that since the measure is constructed to be agnostic regarding 
10











Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Quality of Logistics Infrastructure 
(quartiles)
 Fig. 3.2  Share of vertical affi liates by quality of logistics infrastructure.  Source : Authors’ calculations 
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the importance of speed, it can capture dependence on logistics services for a variety 
of reasons for rapid deliveries—such as the use of perishable goods, goods with short 
life cycles, or those with high demand variability—and in cases where uncertainty 
and potential disruptions in the supply chains must be minimized . 11 
 Figure  3.3 shows the distribution of vertical affi liates for countries with different 
levels of logistics infrastructure (as in Fig.  3.2 ), but in this case the sample is split 
between vertical affi liates in sectors with values of time sensitivity below the median 
and sectors with values of time sensitivity above the median. The fi rst aspect to note 
is that similar to the previous fi gure, countries with better logistics infrastructure 
attract more vertical affi liates than countries with inadequate logistics infrastruc-
ture. This is observed regardless of the sector: i.e., both sets of columns increase 
across the quartiles. Another interesting fi nding is that while both shares of vertical 
affi liates increase from the fi rst to the fourth quartile, the share in sectors with time 
sensitivity above the median increases relatively faster. For instance, while coun-
tries in the second quartile own more vertical affi liates in non-time-sensitive indus-
tries, the opposite is true for the countries in the fourth quartile. This result is 
interesting because it is telling us that countries with better logistics infrastructure 
attract not only more vertical affi liates overall, but also, particularly, affi liates in 
sectors that are more dependent on logistics services.
11
  For instance, Hummmels and Schaur (2012) and Evans and Harrigan ( 2005 ) examine the link 
between speed of delivery and uncertainty due to rapid fl uctuations in demand. Clark, Schaur, and 
Kozlova ( 2012 ) show that fi rms tend to switch to more expensive air shipping when uncertainty in 
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 Fig. 3.3  Share of vertical affi liates by quality of logistics infrastructure and dependence on logis-
tics services.  Source : Authors’ calculations 
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 Figures  3.2 and  3.3 support the notion that countries with adequate transport and 
logistics infrastructure attract more vertical affi liates. But while these results are 
suggestive, they are far from defi nitive. Countries with good logistics infrastructure 
could offer additional benefi ts that would be attractive to vertical FDI. There is also 
the issue of causality: improvements in logistics infrastructure might attract vertical 
FDI, but FDI might also spur investments in logistics infrastructure. Therefore, to 
make a statement on the relationship between logistics infrastructure and interna-
tional production networks, we need an econometric model that isolates the effect 
of logistics infrastructure from other factors while simultaneously addressing the 
issue of causality. For this purpose we employ an augmented version of the empiri-
cal workhorse model in international trade, the gravity equation. 
 A complete description of the model and its estimation is provided in Appendix B 
“Specifi cation for the Model of Vertical FDI and Logistics Infrastructure”. Here we 
present the basic intuition of the quantitative analysis. Table  3.1 summarizes the 
expected signs of all the variables included in the model. In essence, vertical FDI, and 
thus trade of intermediate inputs between a subsidiary and its headquarters, should 
be larger between countries with common borders, a common language, common 
colonial roots, shorter distances, lower trade barriers, larger skill differentials, and 
higher-quality logistics infrastructures in both countries. 12 The analysis also employs 
techniques that control for additional variables at the country and sector level that 
might infl uence vertical FDI but are not observed by the econometrician. 13 
 The dependent variable in the model is the number of vertical affi liates located 
in host country  i from parent country  j and sector  k . The dataset is for the year 2012. 
One interesting aspect of the empirical analysis is that we also formally test the 
proposition that countries with adequate logistics systems may attract more vertical 
12
  We proxy the skill differential by the ratio of the parent country’s skill to the host country’s skill, 
where country skill is the average years of schooling in the population of age 25 and above. Alfaro 
and Charlton ( 2009 ) also use the average years of schooling to proxy for human capital 
abundance. 
13
  These are country and sector fi xed effects. See appendix B “Specifi cation for the Model of 
Vertical FDI and Logistics Infrastructure ” . 
 Table 3.1  Expected relationship between bilateral vertical FDI and its 
determinants 
 Determinants  Expected sign 
 Common border  (+) 
 Common language  (+) 
 Common colonial origins  (+) 
 Distance  (−) 
 Free trade agreement  (+) 
 Skill differential between parent and host country  (+) 
 Quality of logistics infrastructure parent country  (+) 
 Quality of logistics infrastructure host country  (+) 
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FDI in industries that are more dependent on logistics services, as suggested by 
Fig.  3.2 . 14 The outcomes of the regression are consistent with the expectations. Even 
after controlling for the effect of alternative factors, the results indicate that coun-
tries with better logistics infrastructure attract more vertical affi liates, particularly in 
industries that are more dependent on logistics services. As shown in the appen-
dixes, this result holds under alternative estimation techniques and control vari-
ables. 15 The magnitude of the effect is economically meaningful. We fi nd, for 
instance, that a change from the fi rst quartile to the third quartile of the distribution 
of logistics infrastructure is associated with an average increase in the number of 
vertically integrated affi liates equivalent to 15 %. 
 We also explore whether the importance of logistics infrastructure tends to 
increase with distance. One can reasonably assume, for instance, that differences in 
time sensitivity across industries might be less relevant for countries that are very 
close to each other, because products can be delivered quickly. But when countries 
are far apart, these differences should matter more. Results in Table B.1 (in 
Appendix B “Specifi cation for the Model of Vertical FDI and Logistics 
Infrastructure”) confi rm this assumption: the importance of adequate logistics infra-
structure, particularly for logistics-sensitive industries, increases with distance. In 
other words, for distant countries to attract more vertical FDI, issues such as improv-
ing port or airport effi ciency are likely to be more important in offsetting the impact 
of distance than for nearby countries. This result is relevant for Latin American 
countries. For example, the average bilateral distance across all the East Asian + 
ASEAN countries is about 2,400 km, while the average distance across the coun-
tries in Latin America is 3,000 km. If we include the US and Canada, the distance 
across the Americas is 3,200 km, or 30 % more than in Asia. In the case of the 
EU-27, the average bilateral distance is a mere 1,400 km. Therefore, geography 
imposes a challenge when countries in Latin America seek to join distant supply 
chains in Asia or Europe, or even to develop supply chains within their own region. 
What the econometric results suggest is that the issue of logistics infrastructure 
should be, if anything, relatively more important for Latin America than for other 
regions, whose countries tend to be closer to each other. 
14
  Indeed, this test addresses the potential causality issue mentioned earlier. In particular, the test 
implies examining a cross-country, cross-sector interaction effect, the so-called difference-in- 
differences estimation. The estimation seeks to alleviate the potential endogeneity problem associ-
ated with cross-country regressions. The difference-in-differences estimator would suffer from 
reverse causality if the FDI fl ow of a given sector compared to those of other sectors had a causal 
effect on the overall level of logistics infrastructure. This seems much less likely to be the case than 
in the more common cross-country regressions, in which total FDI fl ows could have a causal effect 
on the overall level of logistics infrastructure investment. 
15
  In particular, Appendix B “Specifi cation for the Model of Vertical FDI and Logistics 
Infrastructure” shows that the main fi nding holds under least squares and negative binomial esti-
mations, as well as after the inclusion of parent, subsidiary, and sector-fi xed effects, and under the 
more stringent parent-subsidiary, sector-fi xed effects. In a longer version of this analysis we also 
show that the results are suffi ciently robust to explicitly include additional covariates in the model; 
see Blyde and Molina ( 2013 ). 
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 We now use the results from the estimations to simulate the impact of improving 
the quality of logistics infrastructure in the region. In particular, we ask by how 
much the particular measure of value chain participation would increase if a country 
in LAC improves the quality of its logistics infrastructure to the average level in the 
EU-27. We do this for each of the infrastructure dimensions that comprise the over-
all index: port, airport, and ICT infrastructure. The results for the number of vertical 
affi liates are shown in Fig.  3.4 . 16 Since most countries have important gaps in all 
three infrastructure dimensions, closing any of these gaps generates noticeable 
surges in vertical FDI. On average, the number of vertical affi liates would rise by 
around 20 %; countries with more important shortcomings in logistics infrastruc-
ture, such as Haiti or Paraguay, would experience much larger increases.
 The results in Fig.  3.4 presented the average increase in the number of vertical 
affi liates across all the sectors of the economy. Figure  3.5 shows the results of the 
same simulation when we look only at the sectors with time-sensitivity above the 
median. The fi gure indicates that the number of vertical affi liates in these sectors 
increases even more than before, with an average of 28 % for the entire region.
16
  We use the results from column 3 in Table B.1 (see Appendix B “Specifi cation for the Model of 
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 Fig. 3.4  Simulated change in the number of vertical affi liates from improving logistics infrastruc-
ture to the EU-27 average.  Note : The values for Haiti are represented on the  right axis.  Source : 
Authors’ calculations 
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 Policy Issues 
 Improving a country’s transportation and logistics systems requires that an array of 
issues be addressed, from the quality of the infrastructure to the effi ciency of related 
services. While a detailed description of the required policies is beyond the scope of 
this work, a few general issues of particular importance for production networks 
should be stressed. Box  1 further provides specifi c examples from case studies in 
Latin America in which logistics has been fundamental for enabling fi rms to join or 
develop supply chains. 
 With respect to maritime transportation, countries in Latin American and the 
Caribbean have come a long way since the days of heavy state intervention. Cargo 
reserves for state-owned shipping companies have been mostly eliminated, and 
maritime shipping services have generally been liberalized. In addition, many 
national ports and terminals have granted concessions to private port operators. One 
result has been to trigger a wave of modernization in many port infrastructures, 
including the installation of gantry cranes for faster loading and unloading and elec-
tronic tracking of containers to reduce waiting and turnaround time for ships. 
Although these improvements have been a critical factor for many supply chains, 
the productivity of Latin American port infrastructure remains far from world-class. 
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 Fig. 3.5  Simulated change in the number of vertical affi liates in sectors with time-sensitivity 
above median from improving logistics infrastructure to the EU-27 average  Note : The values for 




 Box 1: The Role of Logistics 
 This box presents two case studies in which logistics policies facilitated the 
spread of global supply chains. 
 Bombardier Querétaro. During the 1970s, the world aeronautic industry was 
vertically integrated, with only about 20 % of the typical aircraft manufacturer’s 
total value being outsourced. Today, that outsourced share is close to 80 %. 
Mexico is taking advantage of this trend by spurring the development of an 
aeronautic cluster, mainly centered in the state of Querétaro. The aim is to 
attract global fi rms and support linkages between them and Mexican suppliers. 
 One of the foreign fi rms attracted to Querétaro was Bombardier, the Canadian 
aircraft manufacturer. Cost advantage, proximity to the US and Canada, and the 
free trade agreement among Mexico, Canada, and the US (NAFTA) were 
among the pull factors for Bombardier. But these incentives were comple-
mented by a series of logistics developments, such as large investments in the 
Querétaro airport. With specialized warehouse services and one of the longest 
runways in the country, the airport sits at the convergence of Mexico’s road, rail, 
and telecommunications network, thereby facilitating multimodal operations 
and allowing Bombardier to ship parts to Wichita and Toronto for assembly 
much more quickly than if they had been produced in China. In fact, 
Bombardier’s plant is located within the perimeters of this airport. 
 Bombardier was attracted to the cluster by the massive transport infrastruc-
ture investments made by the state government. Nevertheless, a number of 
logistics issues also needed to be addressed to guarantee smooth operations of 
the company’s supply chain. For instance, when Bombardier started its opera-
tions in Mexico, the federal customs offi ce was located in downtown 
Querétaro, not at the airport. The authorities initially insisted that every com-
ponent be brought from the airport to downtown for customs clearance, and 
then shipped back to the airport, where the Bombardier factory is located. 
This extra step increased time and costs for customs clearance. Eventually, the 
federal government established a customs area at the airport. 
 Another soft policy measure was the signing of the Bilateral Aviation 
Safety Agreement with the US, which allows Mexico’s civil aviation author-
ity to certify parts and components produced in Mexico. This development 
essentially eliminated one step in the supply chain, which considerably 
reduced costs and time because components and parts no longer had to be 
inspected in the US before being shipped off to the assembly locations. 
 Basso. Since the 1990s, the automotive industry has become more global with 
the growing importance of FDI in developing countries during recent years. 
This shift in global production resulted from a signifi cant organizational 
change in which the Ford model was replaced by the Toyota model, which 
prioritizes production fl exibility, quality, and speed. Assemblers started dele-
gating more design responsibilities to component suppliers, urging the latter 
to supply them with effi cient technological solutions.
(continued) 
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measured in terms of TEU per meter of quay, 17 the average productivity for ports in 
South East Asia is almost three times higher than the average productivity in Latin 
American ports (Drewry,  2010 ). 
17
  The maritime literature frequently uses this performance indicator for container terminals. The 
measure means the number of 20-ft-equivalent unit containers handled per running meter of quay 
per year. 
 Box 1: (continued)
One of these component suppliers is Basso, a producer of combustion 
engine valves, located in Rafaela, Argentina. The fi rm makes valves for auto-
makers (e.g., Peugeot, Ferrari, and Ford), motorcycle producers (Harley 
Davidson), and farm tractor producers (John Deere). 
 Basso has been able to compete globally due to its high-quality customiza-
tion of products and a strict commitment to provide just-in-time delivery ser-
vices, the demanding mode of production that became widespread with the 
emergence of the Toyota model. Logistics is key to the fi rm’s business, and its 
just-in-time delivery service—which coordinates storage, transport, and 
inventory—is one of the fi rm’s main distinguishing features. 
 Complying with just-in-time shipment commitments is not easy, however, 
particularly when about half of the company’s clients are located more than 
8,000 km away. Basso orchestrates a logistical system that makes customers 
feel that such long distances are not relevant. 
 One change that was fundamental to the company’s ability to fulfi ll its 
delivery commitments was the creation of an Argentine customs offi ce in the 
city of Rafaela, a move that resulted from joint action by businessmen and 
city offi cials. The new customs offi ce enables Basso to clear every export and 
import operation in Rafaela without the need to do so at the Port of Buenos 
Aires. Since the valves that are shipped from Rafaela already have customs 
verifi cation and approval, delivery is much more rapid. 
 Despite these advances, the company must still plan for possible logistics 
problems, such as roadblocks or strikes at the ports. For example, the fi rm main-
tains a permanent stock of goods on ships and in warehouses, a practice that 
increases its inventory costs. As such, while the fi rm benefi ts from facilitated 
customs clearance, it incurs other costs in dealing with uncertainty in logistics. 
 The examples of Bombardier and Basso illustrate that creating an adequate 
logistics system is not only about big physical infrastructure works, but also about 
the less visible but perhaps equally important soft policies related to logistics. 
 Sources : the story of Bombardier is based on material from Brown- Grossman 
and Domínguez-Villalobos ( 2012 ) and remarks by Michael R. McAdoo, 
Vice-President of International Trade, Bombardier, at the 2012 World 
Economic Forum on Latin America. The case of Basso is based on material 
from González, Hallak, Schott, and Soria ( 2012 ). 
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 Latin American countries seeking to participate in global production networks 
must therefore continue to pursue reforms that improve the productivity of their port 
infrastructure and increase the effi ciency of their ancillary services, such as cargo 
handling, storage, and warehousing. 
 In addition to the liberalization of the industry and the decentralization of port 
operations, there are many other areas in which the government should play an 
active role. For instance, government must create effective regulations that assure 
proper market contestability to prevent anticompetitive practices by carriers and 
shipping companies (Sanchez & Wilmsmeier,  2009 ). In addition, government must 
make investments, such as channel dredging, to enable larger vessels with lower 
operating costs to enter a port; such investments might not take place without gov-
ernment intervention. Increasingly larger vessels that travel at higher speeds are 
constantly being introduced. The largest vessels currently in use (average 13,000 
TEUs) are expected to start serving the region within the next 5–8 years (CEPAL, 
 2012 ). Accommodating these vessels may require new plans and strategies for port 
industries and related activities in many countries of the region (CEPAL,  2012 ). An 
important step in this direction is the expansion of the Panama Canal. Completion 
of the new set of locks and ancillary projects (dredging and widening), will enable 
the canal to handle containerships of 13,000 TEUs. 
 As with port infrastructure, airport effi ciency has improved as a result of a grad-
ual shift from the traditional public ownership model to arrangements that include 
alternative privatization schemes and concession contracts. With the exception of a 
few services, such as meteorological services, most commercial and handling oper-
ations can be provided on a competitive basis. Airport privatization throughout the 
world has generally led to improvements in effi ciency, but privatization in Latin 
America has proceeded at a slower pace than in many other parts of the world, par-
ticularly in the Asia-Pacifi c region and in industrialized countries (ACI,  2008 ). 
Additionally, transfer of ownership has not always resulted in improved effi ciency, 
due to lack of market contestability. Governments in the region must enact regula-
tory frameworks that ensure competitive conditions for ancillary services 
(Serebrisky, Schwartz, Pachón, & Ricover,  2011 ). 
 Meeting the demands of global supply chains also requires a liberalization of the 
region’s international air services. In other parts of the world, many fi rms engaged 
in production networks can choose among multiple carriers because of more open 
air transport markets. For example, an airline’s right to carry cargo from its own 
country to a second country, and from that country to a third country—the so-called 
“fi fth freedom”—is instrumental for many supply chains. With manufacturers 
demanding inputs from multiple suppliers, the fi fth freedom gives carriers the 
needed fl exibility to serve multiple nodes. 
 In Latin America and the Caribbean, air services are still restricted by old 
bilateral agreements that put stringent limitations on market access. For example, 
while many agreements grant fi fth freedom rights, there are usually maximum 
capacity thresholds, and passengers generally receive preference over cargo. 
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Efforts should be made to remove these maximum thresholds. At a broader level, the 
region must do more to move in tandem with liberalization efforts in other parts of 
the world, most of which have been carried out through open skies agreements. For 
example, it has been shown that open skies agreements signed by the US have 
reduced air transport costs by around 9 % while increasing the share of imports arriv-
ing by air by 7 % (Micco & Serebrisky,  2006 ). A movement towards a regional open 
skies agreement in Latin America and the Caribbean would certainly lower the costs 
of connecting suppliers and buyers in various points of the region’s supply chain. 
 Policy issues also must be addressed to improve the region’s ICT infrastructure. 
Prior to the waves of privatization during the 1990s, prices in the telecommunication 
sector did not refl ect the true costs for providing the services; there were no incentives 
for innovation, and services were generally of low quality (Razo & Rojas Mejia, 
 2007 ). The privatization of the state monopolies brought about more innovation and 
generally increased effi ciency in the provision of services (Aguerro & Mastrini, 
 2009 ; De Laiglesia,  2007 ). However, the liberalization did not automatically result in 
increased competition. Many countries, for example, granted exclusivity periods 
to allow companies to invest in infrastructure upgrading and installation so as to 
 consolidate their position in the market. Such exclusivity periods strengthened the 
dominant position of the incumbent fi rms and created incentives to set high prices 
and prevent access to new services (Razo & Rojas Mejia,  2007 ). The long periods of 
exclusive operation granted to the initial investors signifi cantly delayed the entry of 
new providers and obstructed the creation of competitive markets. 
 Furthermore, the ICT legal frameworks and regulatory agencies that were put in 
place years ago have not proved themselves capable of encouraging competition 
and dealing with the challenges of the sector. For example, fi rms today commonly 
offer packages that combine different types of services. This new trend creates a 
challenge for the regulator, who must determine the relevant market defi nition on 
which to base judgments about anticompetitive behavior (Aldana & Vallejo,  2010 ; 
Rozas,  2002 ). The main challenges in the telecommunication sector today are 
to reduce the high levels of market concentration and create conditions for the 
development of competitive markets. The constant evolution of the sector requires 
the regulator to continuously adapt to deal with these challenges. 
 The econometric exercise in this section explicitly modeled the role of critical 
air, maritime, and ICT infrastructures. However, although these infrastructures are 
important pieces of a country’s logistics system, they are not the only ones. Supply 
chains also require more effi cient customs services and streamlined security clear-
ance processes (see Box  1 and also the next section). Likewise, inadequate internal 
transport-related infrastructure, including the low density and poor quality of many 
road networks in Latin America, have been shown to negatively impact the region’s 
trade performance. In this area, important policy issues range from placing a new 
priority on these long-neglected investments to improving regulation of the domes-
tic transport industry. These important subjects deserve to be addressed in separate 
reports (see, for instance, Mesquita Moreira, Blyde, Volpe, & Molina,  2013 ). 
Policy Issues
44
 Production Disintegration and Market Integration: 
Deep Integration Agreements at Work 
 How do economic integration agreements affect the formation of international 
 supply chains? Under what conditions do they support production networks among 
countries? Are trade agreements, and trade policy in general, partly responsible 
for the lack of participation of Latin American countries in global value chains? 
This section seeks to provide some answers to these important questions. 
 Casual evidence and regional studies often suggest that many global supply 
chains are affected by agreements and/or arrangements between nations. For 
instance, before the 1965 US–Canada Auto Agreement, trade in auto parts between 
these two countries practically did not exist. After the agreement was signed and 
tariff barriers were reduced to 0, a US–Canada auto supply chain was created and 
auto trade soared (Hummels, Rapoport, & Yi,  1998 ). 18 
 It is self-evident that tightly integrated countries are more likely to share interna-
tional production networks. To begin with, crossing borders is always associated 
with additional costs, such as the tariff duties, which are commonly removed in 
trade agreements. The impact of removing tariff barriers can be proportionally 
larger for a production process that crosses borders many times—often the case for 
many supply chains—than for a fi nal good that crosses borders only once. 19 Beyond 
the issue of tariffs, establishing production networks across countries may involve a 
mix of fl ows related to trade, investment, and technical knowledge, whose maximi-
zation requires the close collaboration of the parties involved. For instance, offshor-
ing from an affi liate involves making cross-border investments that might not take 
place without adequate investment rules in the host country. Similarly, engaging in 
contract manufacturing with local suppliers typically requires a fl ow of knowledge 
that some lead fi rms may be reluctant to provide without adequate intellectual 
 property rights. Rapid delivery of products, a feature of particular importance for 
many industries (as observed in the last section), might require harmonizing and 
streamlining customs and security procedures among the parties involved. In short, 
complex cross-border activities tend to demand complex rules (Baldwin,  2012 ). 
18
  Likewise, Curran and Zignago ( 2012 ) show that after the expansion of the European Union in 
2004, the new members became a much more important source of intermediate inputs for the old 
members of the union. Similarly, Karkkainen ( 2008 ) shows that fl ows of FDI from the old EU 
members to the new members increased to unprecedented levels in the run up to the expansion. The 
main FDI recipients were Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, the three countries that since 
then have become crucial parts of the European supply chain. In Asia, the initial growth of produc-
tion networks may have induced a rising demand for the harmonization of certain national policies 
across jurisdictions and generally deeper integration, to enable cross-border production networks 
to operate more smoothly (WTO,  2011 ). 
19
  This notion is formally developed by Ishii and Yi ( 1997 ), who show that tariff reductions have a 
proportionately greater effect on vertical trade involving goods produced sequentially in multiple 
countries relative to goods produced entirely in one country. 
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 In this regard, deep integration schemes may be associated with more cross- border 
production sharing because they tend to incorporate disciplines beyond the simple 
reduction of tariff rates. These disciplines include, among others, rules in investment 
policy, intellectual property rights, or the harmonization of management techniques 
in customs procedures to expedite clearance of goods. In short, deep integration 
agreements tend to create conditions that are likely to be important for global supply 
chains. 
 In this section we analyze the proposition that economic integration agreements 
facilitate the process of fragmentation. In particular, we examine the notion that 
deep agreements provide greater incentives for the formation of global supply 
chains than shallow agreements. If integration agreements, particularly deep ones, 
are closely associated with the formation of international supply chains, two general 
issues emerge for the countries of Latin America. On the one hand, the prospects of 
improving the region’s participation in extra-regional production networks gov-
erned by the countries’ respective agreements are likely to remain limited unless 
membership in those agreements is expanded or their rules of origin are made more 
fl exible; we will examine this issue later in this section. The other issue is related to 
the multiple trade agreements in Latin America. The countries in LAC are not inte-
grated in one regional trade agreement but share memberships through a complex 
web of multiple agreements that are likely to restrict the scope of production frag-
mentation across the region. We will also examine this issue later in this section. 
 We will fi rst analyze the impacts on GVC participation that one could expect 
from trade agreements. For this purpose, we use an econometric model that exam-
ines the effects of economic integration agreements on a measure of offshoring 
based on the FDI data introduced in Chap.  2 , specifi cally, the vertically linked 
 subsidiaries. The model estimates the impacts of economic integration agreements 
on the number of vertically integrated foreign subsidiaries in a pair of host–parent 
countries in a particular year during the period 1980–2005. It includes a series of 
variables that control for time-invariant country-pair characteristics (such as  bilateral 
distance) as well as for host and parent characteristics, such as GDP, that vary over 
time. Details of the model and the data employed can be found in Appendix B 
“The Effects of Economic Integration Agreements: Estimation and Data Sources”. 
 The results (shown in Fig.  3.6 ) indicate that economic integration agreements 
have a positive and signifi cant impact on the number of vertically linked subsidiar-
ies hosted by partner countries. The fi rst bar shows that countries with trade agree-
ments have 8 % more subsidiaries than countries with no trade agreements. The 
next three bars present the results of an exercise that examines the premise that deep 
forms of integration induce more cross-border production sharing than shallow 
trade agreements. For the sake of simplicity, we have grouped the agreements into 
three types: preferential trade agreements (PTA), free trade agreements (FTA), and 
deep integration agreements, which cover customs unions (CU), common markets 
(CM), and economic unions (EU). The fi gure shows that preferential trade agree-
ments do not have a signifi cant effect on cross-border production sharing. Countries 
with free trade agreements, however, have 9 % more subsidiaries than countries 
with no free trade agreements. Finally, countries with deep trade agreements, 
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such as common markets or economic unions, have 12 % more subsidiaries than 
countries without deep trade agreements. These fi ndings support the notion 
 mentioned earlier that deep integration agreements provide more incentives for the 
formation of global supply chains than shallow agreements, because they tend 
to incorporate measures beyond the simple reduction of tariff rates. In so doing, 
they address a number of dimensions that tend to be important for well-functioning 
supply chains.
 We can probe more deeply into the relationship between trade agreements and 
vertical FDI by exploring the channels by which trade agreements increase the num-
ber of vertically linked affi liates. In our analysis, we wish to determine whether the 
total increase in the number of subsidiaries is due primarily to an increase in the 
number of subsidiaries opened by parent companies or to an increase in the total 
number of parent companies opening subsidiaries. Likewise, we investigate whether 
the increase in the number of subsidiaries corresponds to an expansion of the num-
ber of subsidiaries in the same sectors or an expansion in new sectors. The results 
(shown in Fig.  3.7 ) suggest two things: fi rst, the increase in production fragmenta-
tion is primarily due to an increase in the total number of parent companies opening 
subsidiaries; and second, the increase mainly occurs due to a greater diversifi cation 
of sectors in which these plants operate.
 One issue regarding integration agreements and production networks is that while 
such agreements may induce the formation of production networks, existing produc-
tion networks might also generate demand for integration agreements. Such a demand 
for deeper integration, for example, could take the form of the elimination of techni-
cal barriers to trade, which tend to be costly for offshoring (Lawrence,  1996 ). 
 In Asia, for example, many regional production networks were developed prior 
to the acceleration of Asian integration under the ASEAN Free Trade Area and 
 Fig. 3.6  Estimated impact of trade agreements on vertical FDI.  Source : Authors’ calculations 
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 Fig. 3.7  Estimated impact of trade agreements on vertical FDI, by channels.  Source : Authors’ 
calculations 
under the ASEAN+1 FTAs (Kimura & Obashi,  2011 ). Still, many pro-trade and 
investment policies implemented in Asia may have contributed to this early growth 
of regional supply chains, such as the aggressive moves to attract FDI that started in 
the late 1980s, the unilateral trade liberalization periods, the establishment of export 
processing zones, and, particularly, the low levels of protection for the imports of 
intermediate inputs, which we will discuss later. 
 Generally, however, the potential causality from GVCs to trade agreements could 
introduce a bias in the estimations we presented above. Therefore, we performed a 
series of tests to examine the possibility of reverse causality. For instance, we 
included both lagged and lead values of the agreement variable. While the lag val-
ues were signifi cant, the lead values were not. In addition, we conducted a placebo 
exercise by examining whether there was a correlation between current production 
linkages and future agreements; we found no evidence of such a correlation (see 
Appendix B “The Effects of Economic Integration Agreements: Estimation and 
Data Sources” for details). These results indicate that the potential causality from 
production networks to agreements is unlikely to explain the results presented 
above. 
 Policy Issues 
 While deep integration schemes are associated with GVCs, it is clear that the mul-
tilateral approach would be the optimal way to foster global production networks. 
As regional trade agreements continue to multiply, a fi rm seeking to participate in 




keep track of all the differences in the governing rules. Similarly, as the production 
of a good is sliced up across more and more countries, barriers between third 
 countries upstream or downstream become as important as the barriers between the 
two main partners; they might better be addressed together. But the evolution of 
the multilateral system has not kept up with modern trends of production fragmenta-
tion, and it has yet to provide the policy environment at the global level that interna-
tional supply chains need to thrive. Instead, countries have used bilateral and 
regional trade agreements to fi ll this void. 
 Trade agreements (TAs), however, can be associated with the well-known prob-
lem of trade diversion, the situation in which trade is shifted from a more effi cient 
producer that does not belong to the agreement to a less effi cient producer within 
the agreement. 
 Another potential risk of TAs is that sometimes they set stringent limits regard-
ing the scope of activities within the supply chain in which the member countries 
can engage. This was the case with the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), in which 
the member countries exporting textiles to the US enjoyed tariff-free status in the 
US, but only for the most basic assembly operations of the textile and apparel indus-
try, mainly sewing. Eventually, the CBI was expanded into the Caribbean Basin 
Trade and Promotion Act (CBTPA), but even at this point the tariff rate fell to 0 only 
on products in which the local value added consisted of cut, make, trim, and fi nish-
ing operations. Not until CAFTA went into effect in 2005 could every aspect of the 
production process in this supply chain of textiles and apparel, including the use of 
local yarns, fi bers, and other raw materials, be performed in the Central American 
countries (Pipkin,  2011 ). This example shows that even though some TAs can open 
up new prospects for developing countries to participate in cross-border production 
sharing, this participation may be limited to only a few segments of the supply 
chain, a practice that could eliminate potentially important opportunities. 
 TAs may also discourage the utilization of cheaper parts and materials from third 
countries due to their rules of origin (RoO). This is particularly the case if these 
parts and materials are used to produce fi nal goods that are later exported to other 
members of the agreement. In this sense, RoO could increase production costs to the 
point where the cost of compliance exceeds the benefi t of the preferences conferred 
by the agreement (Estevadeordal & Suominen,  2006 ,  2008 ). This can be especially 
problematic for Latin American countries seeking to participate in extra-regional 
supply chains, particularly in North America, the EU, and Asia. 
 Of course, RoO are critical parts of many TAs because they establish the conditions 
that a product must satisfy to be deemed eligible for preferential access in the member 
countries. They are primarily used to prevent trade defl ection—that is, to prevent 
products from non-participating countries reaching a high-tariff TA partner via the 
transshipment of the product through a low-tariff TA member. But RoO can severely 
narrow the choices that fi rms have for locating slices of their production abroad. 
 TAs also require that fi rms deal with the potential complexity associated with 
keeping track of multiple RoO. When an exporter produces only one good and most 
intermediate inputs are sourced domestically, the costs of complying with multiple 
RoO might not be too large. But when an exporter produces more goods, and the 
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sourcing involves many countries, the costs of dealing with multiple origins can 
be substantially greater. These costs may increase even more if the suppliers are not 
wholly owned affi liates but rather independent fi rms in other countries. In this case, 
transparent channels for conveying the supplier’s origin information, such as 
pricing and other sensitivity issues, are less likely to exist. For instance, suppliers 
might lack suffi cient incentives to provide their clients with complete sourcing 
information for fear that this might jeopardize their relationship; the client might 
then make direct contact with the subcontractor and cut the supplier out of the chain 
(Staples & Harris,  2009 ). 
 The question is how to better align the legitimate practice of curbing trade defl ec-
tion with the reality of GVCs. The constraints generally presented by RoO, can be 
reduced through the use of various mechanisms, such as higher de minimis levels, 
allowing for duty drawback, or fl exible cumulation rules. 
 De minimis rules, for example, allow for the use of a specifi ed percentage of 
non-originating products in the production process without affecting the origin sta-
tus of the fi nal product. Duty drawback is used to return the payment of applicable 
duties to the non-originating material employed in the production of a fi nal product 
that is subsequently exported to other members of the agreement. 
 Finally, cumulation generally means that inputs from trading partners can be 
used in the production of a fi nal good without undermining the product’s origin. 
Practically all TAs permit bilateral cumulation, meaning that materials originating 
in any one member country are considered as originating in the partner country and 
vice versa. In agreements among more than two countries this is sometimes called 
diagonal cumulation. Full cumulation means that any operation performed in any of 
the partner countries can be counted, whether or not the processing is suffi cient to 
confer originating status upon the materials themselves. Full cumulation is particu-
larly benefi cial to the formation of regional value chains, as it allows the various 
contributions to the fi nal product to be accounted and combined to establish its 
origin. Additionally, there is a growing trend to employ expanded cumulation to 
allow three or more countries with separate but overlapping trade agreements to 
effectively merge their individual bilateral treaties so that inputs can be sourced 
anywhere within the network. This approach could be the most effective strategy for 
“multilateralizing” RoO across trade agreements. 
 Ample empirical evidence suggests that some of these mechanisms can ease 
 constraints imposed by RoO and generate larger trade fl ows. The evidence is par-
ticularly strong for the role of cumulation schemes (Augier, Gasiorek, & Tong, 
 2005 ; Estevadeordal & Suominen,  2008 ; Hayakawa,  2012 ; Park & Park,  2009 ). 20 
20
  The evidence is based on different identifi cation techniques. For instance, Estevadeordal and 
Suominen ( 2008 ) and Park and Park ( 2009 ) look at the difference in trade fl ows across groups of 
country pairs (i.e., differences between members of agreements with diagonal cumulation and 
members of agreements without diagonal cumulation). Augier et al. ( 2005 ) compare trade fl ows in 
the same country pairs before and after the introduction of diagonal cumulation. Hayakawa ( 2012 ) 
compares trade fl ows between the same two countries but under two kinds of schemes—one with 
bilateral cumulation and another with diagonal cumulation. 
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All of these analyses show positive and signifi cant trade effects of more fl exible 
cumulation schemes. For instance, Augier et al. ( 2005 ) and Hayakawa ( 2012 ) show 
trade creation effects on the order of four to 15 % associated with diagonal accumula-
tion. Even larger effects, on the order of 30–100 %, are found when comparing mem-
bers in full cumulation schemes to those in bilateral cumulation schemes 
(Estevadeordal & Suominen,  2008 ; Park & Park,  2009 ). Therefore, there is a compel-
ling argument in favor of expanding the cumulation of RoOs to reduce the implicit 
costs faced by active and potential participants of international production networks. 
 There are signs that countries in many parts of the world are growing more aware 
of the importance of fl exible sourcing schemes. For example, over the nearly 20 
years of NAFTA’s operation, the agreement has gone through four rounds of changes 
in RoO that have become progressively more permissive of materials from outside 
North America. This is clearly good news for other countries in Latin America aim-
ing to enter production networks within the North American hub. Other agreements 
have similar mechanisms for amending their RoO over time, although as other 
agreements also learned from the NAFTA experience, they have tended to negotiate 
less restrictive rules in the fi rst place. 
 The evidence also shows that reforms have been made that deal with issues such 
as cumulation. As mentioned before, the existence of multiple and overlapping 
trade agreements can impose limits on the fragmentation of production across bor-
ders. Countries are becoming more aware of the need to eliminate those frictions. 
Perhaps the most substantial experiment in the expansion of cumulation involved 
the Pan-Euro-Med cumulation zone. The mechanism that went into effect in 1997 
harmonized the RoO provisions of more than ten bilateral EU agreements and 
enabled cumulation among all of the partners. 
 One notable Latin American experience of cumulation involved Central America 
and Mexico. Between 1995 and 2001, Mexico had signed separate agreements with 
Costa Rica (1995), Nicaragua (1998), and the “Northern Triangle” of El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras (2001). These agreements did not provide for cumulation 
among all six countries and thus had the effect of segmenting value chains that tied 
the Central American countries to Mexico. For example, chocolates from Costa 
Rica would not encounter tariff charges in Mexico as long as they were produced 
entirely in Costa Rica, but the same chocolates would pay a tariff duty if they used 
cocoa paste from Honduras. In 2011, however, the countries signed a new agree-
ment that enables full cumulation across all six countries under a single set of RoO 
agreed upon by all parties, giving fi rms much more fl exibility regarding where to 
source their various inputs. While the Mexico–Central America example is a step in 
the right direction, a more systemic approach is needed. One bold move would be to 
promote cumulation of origin across the many bilateral and regional trade agree-
ments in LAC. As a result, fi rms would be better able to take advantage of the dif-
ferences in factors prices across locations, resulting in more cross-border production 
sharing within the region. 
 In other regions, two negotiations are underway that could have profound effects 
on the ability of companies to form sophisticated GVCs. The fi rst is the Trans- 
Pacifi c Partnership (TPP), which joins 14 countries in a single agreement; members 
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include the NAFTA countries, Japan, Peru, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, and four 
ASEAN countries. Negotiating texts published thus far do not make it clear how the 
countries intend to structure the cumulation provisions, but it is vital that the struc-
turing be done as broadly and inclusively as possible. If complete cumulation, 
including all members of the agreement for all products, is not a feature of the TPP, 
its eventual value will be signifi cantly undermined, especially for supporting the 
formation of GVCs. Furthermore, since the TPP will include two of the three GVC 
hubs—Japan and the US— cumulation is needed to exploit complementarities 
between these hubs. 
 The second negotiation is the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
between the US and the EU, which aims to eliminate tariffs and seeks regulatory 
harmonization between the world’s two largest economies. In matters of preferen-
tial market access, both the US and the EU have large networks of trade agreements 
with third countries in all regions of the globe. The elimination of bilateral tariffs 
would erode those preferences. While there is no obligation to mitigate preference 
erosion, this could be accomplished by explicitly including mechanisms for expand-
ing cumulation to these third parties. Such mechanisms would allow third countries 
to participate in the GVCs operating in these economies, gaining benefi ts instead of 
being sidelined. On this issue, however, LAC countries have very little infl uence. 
Nevertheless, where both the US and the EU have already granted duty-free access 
to materials from many countries in the region, it would seem particularly unreason-
able to exclude them from bilateral value chains. 
 There is also the issue of harmonization of RoO across agreements. Since har-
monizing the rules themselves might be quite diffi cult, countries instead may want 
to focus on harmonizing the methods of calculating regional value content, as well 
as on the procedures for certifying and verifying origin. The evidence suggests that 
differences in these mechanisms and procedures have caused tremendous problems 
for fi rms seeking to take advantage of trade agreements. Therefore, the bulk of the 
gains from RoO harmonization are likely to be in this area. 
 Another and more general issue regarding trade policy is related to the protec-
tionist bias that remains in many parts of the world. As we mentioned above, certain 
trade agreements have been designed to limit the participation of developing coun-
tries to only a few segments of the supply chain. This is only a manifestation of a 
more endemic practice called the tariff escalation problem, in which countries 
impose low duties on raw materials but higher duties on higher value-added seg-
ments of the supply chain. This problem is not as severe as in the past (WTO,  2008 ), 
but it still exists. Box  2 shows a very simple example of the MFN tariffs imposed by 
the countries of the European Union on various segments of the automotive indus-
try. The existing scheme clearly generates disincentives to move beyond the supply 
of raw materials and into higher value-added segments of the automotive supply 
chain. Table  3.2 shows that the practice of tariff escalation is not restricted to the 
automotive sector but rather is widespread across many industries.
 Many countries, including developing nations, engage in tariff escalation. 
However, since the industrialized world leads most of the international supply chains, 
tariff escalation is particularly harmful for developing countries’ participation in 
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 Box 2: Tariff Escalation in the Automotive Industry 
 Following is an illustration of how tariff escalation in developed countries 
generates disincentives in Latin American countries to upgrade in interna-
tional supply chains. 
 Figure  3.8 shows the EU’s simple average MFN-applied tariffs for selected 
products used in the automotive industry, including aluminum ore, a raw 
material produced in large quantities in the region and used in many vehicle 
components. A Latin American exporter of aluminum ore would pay no duties 
to enter the European market. However, a fi rm in Latin America that uses that 
aluminum ore to produce pistons for engines faces a duty of 2.7 % to export 
its pistons to Europe. If instead the fi rm decides to produce not only the pis-
tons but the entire engine, the European tariff rate will rise to 4 %, and if that 
engine is mounted to a chassis, the tariff increases to 9.1 %, and so on. This 
example illustrates how progressively higher tariffs in the automobile supply 
chain generate disincentives to move beyond the supply of raw materials and 
into other segments downstream in the industry. 
 supply chains when the practice is employed in the industrial world. This is clearly 
an obstacle for many fi rms in Latin America seeking to move beyond the simple 
provision of raw materials and into other segments of the industrialized world’s 
 supply chains. 
 Another issue related to trade policy concerns the capacity of local fi rms to 
 complement their production with high-quality inputs from other countries. 
The emergence of international production networks has indeed strengthened the 














 Fig. 3.8  EU average unweighted MFN applied tariff, selected products 
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chains source inputs not only from their own countries but also from other parts of 
the world. The capacity to export successfully in international markets increasingly 
depends on the capacity to import effi cient inputs. Constraining access to high-
quality inputs from abroad through high levels of protection may increase produc-
tion costs and damage the ability of potential suppliers to provide adequate and 
reliable products in downstream segments of international supply chains. Local 
content and trade balance measures—the so-called performance requirements—
also force fi rms (in particular multinational corporations, MNCs) to draw their 
intermediate inputs from local production, thus limiting their freedom to use 
imported supplies. 21 Countries in Latin America will have more opportunities to 
participate in international production networks when access to foreign intermedi-
ate inputs becomes more liberalized. 
 We will conclude this section by refl ecting on the potential scope for developing 
international production networks as countries become more integrated. The econo-
metric results shown above provide evidence that countries engaging in deep forms 
of integration tend to share more production processes. But this does not necessarily 
imply that the production networks must originate exclusively in the countries party 
to the agreement. Regional integration could also help attract production from  outside 
the region that is subsequently sliced and shared among the countries of the agree-
ment. Hard proof of this argument is diffi cult to fi nd, but casual evidence suggests 
that such processes occur more often than expected. An example is found in research 
by Hiratsuka ( 2011 ) and Sturgeon and Florida ( 2004 ), who show how multinationals 
21
  Local content requirements specify the percentage or the absolute value of inputs that must be 
acquired from local sources or produced domestically. Trade balancing requirements normally 
limit the imports of the fi rm to some proportion of the value of its exports. 
 Table 3.2  Average unweighted applied MFN tariffs, 2011 








fi nished  Finished 
 Fish and fi sh products  9.33  12.50  14.31  0.41  1.65  3.36 
 Fruit and vegetables  6.69  10.30  15.44  5.37  7.04  10.85 
 Coffee, tea, mate, and cocoa  3.07  8.73  9.46  0.58  0.00  5.96 
 Mineral products 
and precious metals 
 0.12  2.19  3.14  0.33  0.84  3.38 
 Metal ores  0.00  1.57  2.81  0.09  1.18  2.00 
 Wood, pulp, paper, 
and furniture 
 0.00  0.59  0.62  0.00  0.12  0.63 
 Textiles and clothing  2.98  6.57  9.73  3.47  9.40  8.52 
 Leather, rubber, and footwear  0.07  2.43  6.00  0.00  2.02  5.60 
 Source : TRAINS 
 Note : The table shows the average unweighted applied MFN tariffs in the EU and the US for various 
categories of products. The tariffs are shown in MTN (Multilateral Trade Negotiation) categories 
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in the automobile industry source their inputs. Traditionally, subsidiaries of major 
multinationals located in different countries sourced most of their inputs domesti-
cally, except for key components like engines or transmissions, which were supplied 
by their parent countries. However, this practice has been changing rapidly, and 
nowhere is this more evident than among the ASEAN countries. Highly incentivized 
by the ASEAN Free Trade Area, assembly plants located in the ASEAN countries 
trade large quantities of inputs among themselves. A plant (and its suppliers) in each 
country tends to specialize in the production of specifi c components of the car; then 
each plant exports these components to the other plants of the multinational while 
importing from them the inputs that are not produced there. Therefore, multination-
als from Japan and the US are effectively slicing the production of their cars across 
various ASEAN countries, taking advantage of their highly integrated space. 
 This suggests that more regional integration need not be viewed solely as an 
instrument to develop supply chains originated in Latin America. More regional 
integration can also attract fi rms from outside the region and encourage them to 
establish their supply chains among the Latin American countries. 
 Production Unbundling and Firm Boundaries: 
Foreign Affi liates or Local Suppliers? 
 Firms planning to fragment production internationally must decide on the degree of 
control that they want to exercise over the process; as mentioned in Chap.  1 , this is 
called the internalization decision. In this classic make-or-buy decision, the fi rm 
chooses either to outsource the procurement of its inputs to non-affi liated suppliers 
or to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) and import intermediate inputs from 
its affi liates. This issue is important for countries wishing to know whether the opti-
mal strategy for improving their participation in production networks should be 
based on attracting affi liates of multinationals or relying on their local suppliers. 
 At the heart of this issue is the basic question of why some fi rms decide to off-
shore part of their production process to external suppliers while others prefer to 
employ affi liated plants. Nike, for instance, subcontracts part of its production to 
independent factories in several countries and keeps only stages, like design and 
marketing, within the boundaries of the fi rm. An example of the second form of 
offshoring is illustrated by General Motors Corporation, which relies on GM affi li-
ates located in different countries to produce specifi c vehicle components: GM 
Powertrain-Kaiserslautern in Germany for manufacturing engines, GM Delphi 
Interior Systems in Mexico for airbags, or GM Strasbourg in France for carburetors, 
pistons, rings, and valves (Alfaro & Charlton,  2009 ). 
 It could be possible that the type of offshoring that fi rms choose is an arbitrary deci-
sion not based on a particular determinant. However, empirical analyses demonstrate 
some industry patterns in how fi rms choose to offshore production. For example, 
Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott ( 2010 ) show that trade between affi liates and 
headquarters of the same fi rm (intra-fi rm trade) accounts for more than 70 % of US 
imports in industries such as vehicle engines and medical equipment and instruments, 
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suggesting that most of the offshoring in these industries occurs through vertical 
FDI. However, in the rubber and plastic footwear industries, the share of intra-fi rm 
trade is only 2 %, indicating that offshoring in this case takes place mostly among 
fi rms in the US and independent contractors in other countries. The existence of indus-
try patterns suggests that the internalization decision does not occur at random, but is 
rather a process determined by the interplay of various factors. 
 If the decision is not random, countries in Latin America should know what these 
determinants are in order to design strategies to maximize their chances of joining 
international production networks. For instance, if offshoring in certain industries 
occurs mostly through affi liates of MNCs, then countries seeking to join production 
networks in those industries may need to focus on attracting multinationals. But if 
joining a supply chain is more likely to occur through linking with independent sup-
pliers, as in the case of Nike, then countries should provide support to existing local 
plants. The general questions then are: Under what conditions should countries 
wishing to participate in global production networks seek to attract vertical FDI? 
And under what conditions should they foster their domestic suppliers? This section 
provides some insights into this important question. 
 Analysis of this issue requires information on whether offshoring occurs between 
lead fi rms and their affi liates in other countries, or between lead fi rms and indepen-
dent suppliers. Unfortunately, there are practically no international trade data on 
transactions identifying the relationship between the supplier and the buyer. A rare 
exception is the US Related Party Trade database compiled by the US Census Bureau. 
These data distinguish whether each international trade transaction in the US occurs 
between affi liated parties or between independent fi rms. We employ this data in this 
section. Appendix B “Specifi cation for the Model of Intra-fi rm Trade” provides more 
details regarding this dataset as well as the estimations presented in this section. 
 A cursory look at these data across industries reveals considerable variation in 
intra-fi rm imports among industries. Some industries are largely traded between 
affi liated parties, while others are mostly traded between independent fi rms. Fig.  3.9 , 
for instance, shows that while imports of electrical equipment, transport equipment, 
or computer and electronic products exhibit intra-fi rm shares higher than 50 %, the 
equivalent fi gures for livestock, leather, and fi sh products are close to 10 %. The 
results are very similar regardless of whether we consider the imports of all goods 
or the imports of intermediates only, which is a closer proxy to the goods traded in 
international production networks. 22 
22
  To eliminate the exports of fi nal goods from the total fl ows of exports we employ the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) 2002 Import Matrix and Input-Output table, which is disaggregated at 
the six-digit NAICS level. This information shows the share of imports that is used as intermediate 
inputs and the share of imports that is used for fi nal consumption for each import at the six-digit 
NAICS level. We multiply the share of imports that is used as an intermediate with the fl ows of 
related and non-related party trade to eliminate the exports of fi nal goods in each category. Then, 
we recalculate the ratio of related to total (related + non-related) exports. The use of I-O tables to 
separate intermediates and fi nal goods has gained favor in recent years because it avoids the arbi-
trariness of classifi cation schemes that divide goods into intermediate and other categories, as 
stressed by Hummels, Ishii, and Yi ( 2001 ). 
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 While the results from Fig.  3.9 suggest that industry characteristics play an 
important role in the mode by which fi rms select to offshore their production, other 
factors might also drive the fi nal outcome. However, it is possible that these other 
factors are masked by the averages for each industry. In Fig.  3.10 , for example, we 
present an example for a particular industry: electrical equipment, appliances, and 
components (NAICS 335). Even though in Fig.  3.9 this industry has, on average, a 
share of intra-fi rm imports of around 50 %, the results from Fig.  3.10 indicate that 
the share associated with each exporting country varies from 0 to 100 %. A similar 
fi nding is observed in many other industries. This implies that the mode of offshor-
ing is not completely determined by the industry characteristic. Some country char-
acteristics of the supplier are also likely to play a role. 23 
 The evidence presented in Figs.  3.9 and  3.10 indicate two groups of factors that 
determine the optimal mode of offshoring: those that are intrinsic to the production 
process (or the industry) and those that are related to country characteristics. 
Regarding product (or industry) characteristics, it is argued, for example, that the 
more standardized or codifi ed the knowledge, the greater the chances that the off-
shoring will occur through independent contractors. Conversely, in highly 
knowledge- intensive sectors, and in industries where knowledge tends to be tacit 
23
 Antràs ( 2014 ) also shows that US intra-fi rm shares vary (i) greatly across exporting countries 
within narrowly defi ned products and (ii) across products within exporting countries. 
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 Fig. 3.9  Share of US imports that is intra-fi rm, by industry (three-digit NAICS), 2010.  Source : 
Authors’ calculations based on the Related Party Trade dataset from the US Census Bureau 
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and diffi cult to transfer, vertical FDI is more likely to occur. With respect to country 
factors, it is often argued, for example, that the capacity of the host country 
to enforce contracts plays an important role in the FDI vs. outsourcing decision. 
The prevailing view is that if contracts in host countries are hard to enforce, then 
multinationals have an incentive to internalize activities via vertical FDI to ensure 
that the parties abide by their obligations. But when the contractual environment 
strengthens, then outsourcing with external suppliers is more likely to occur. 
 In the last decade, a growing body of studies has analyzed this particular decision 
of whether to offshore through affi liates or independent contractors (Antràs,  2003 ; 
Antràs & Helpman,  2004 ;  Antràs & Helpman,  2008 ; Costinot, Oldenski, & Rauch, 
 2011 ). A key feature from this literature is that there is indeed a tradeoff between 
employing independent contractors and opening affi liates, which depends on a 
complex interaction of factors, some of which are related to intrinsic characteristics 
of the industry and others to host country-specifi c factors. 24 
 A brief summary of the key aspects of this literature can provide helpful insights. 
One industry-related aspect that affects the choice between vertical FDI and outsourc-
ing is the factor intensity of the industry. The argument is based on the notion that local 
suppliers tend to have superior knowledge for hiring and managing local workers. 
24
  The theory reviewed here is not the only one developed to explain the boundaries of multina-
tional corporations (see, for instance, Buckley & Casson,  1976 ). Nevertheless, we focus on the 









 Fig. 3.10  Share of US imports of electrical equipment, appliances, and components that is intra- 
fi rm, by country of export, 2010.  Source : Authors’ calculations based on the Related Party Trade 
dataset from the US Census Bureau 
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Therefore, in labor-intensive industries, local management is important, and 
 outsourcing tends to be the preferred choice for offshoring. In comparison, manag-
ing workers is a much less challenging proposition in capital-intensive industries, 
making the importance of local management less relevant. Therefore, in capital- 
intensive industries, vertical integration is more likely to occur. Figure  3.11 provides 
some support for this prediction. As shown by the trend line, the share of intra-fi rm 
trade is positively correlated with the degree of capital intensity of the industry.
 Another factor that affects the choice between vertical FDI and outsourcing ema-
nates from the fi rst aspect and is related to country characteristics. Comparative 
advantage theory states that capital-abundant countries tend to specialize in capital- 
intensive industries. If vertical integration is the preferred arrangement for capital- 
intensive industries, as mentioned above, then capital-abundant countries are more 
likely to engage in intra-fi rm trade than capital-scarce countries. Figure  3.12 shows 
again some support for this prediction. Capital-abundant countries are more likely to 
engage in intra-fi rm trade, a positive relationship that is clearly visible in the fi gure.
 Another important factor that infl uences whether or not offshoring will take 
place through vertical FDI or through independent fi rms is related to the nature of 
the contract between the parties involved. In general, if the product is easily “con-
tractible,” then fi rms fragmenting production internationally can turn to indepen-
dent suppliers to source their inputs through outsourcing. When the product is not 
contractible, vertical FDI is favored because multinationals tend to internalize all 
production activities to ensure that all obligations are met. Again, this is shown in 
the data. Following Nunn and Trefl er ( 2008 ), the proxy we use for the diffi culty of 
writing contracts is the proportion of each sector’s intermediate inputs that are not 
traded on organized exchanges or have reference prices; these conditions are likely 
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 Fig. 3.11  Intra-fi rm trade and industry capital intensity.  Source : Authors’ calculations 
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are more contract intensive (and where contracting problems are more likely to be 
present) tend to have larger shares of intra-fi rm trade. In other words, in industries 
that are more susceptible to potential contracting problems, offshoring tends to 
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 Fig. 3.13  Intra-fi rm trade and industry contract intensity.  Source : Authors’ calculations 
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 It is important to note that the concept of contractibility depends not only on the 
characteristics of the good but also on the characteristics of the contracting institutions 
in the countries. In the fi rst case, a product is contractible when its characteristics 
make it is easy to write a contract and verify the investments made by the parties. This 
is the industry-related aspect of contractibility. 25 In the second case, a product is con-
tractible when it is easy to comply with a contract because the institutions in the 
country are adequate for doing so; this is the country-related aspect of contractibility. 
 The general view of the so-called transaction costs literature (e.g., Williamson, 
 1975 ,  1985 ) on this issue is that improvements in the contractibility environment of 
a host country tend to trigger an increase in outsourcing instead of FDI, because 
multinationals can rely more on the local legal system to ensure compliance with 
the contracts. 
 In Fig.  3.14 we show the relationship between intra-fi rm trade and a measure of the 
quality of the host country’s contracting institutions. The fi gure suggests that coun-
tries with better contractual environments export more to the US through intra- fi rm 
transactions, which in principle goes against the prevailing view that vertical FDI is 
the most popular choice to deal with problems of weak contracting institutions. 
The results of the fi gure, however, do not test the transaction costs theory, because this 
25
  Note that changes in technology might impact the contractibility of a product. For instance, it has 
been argued that many electronics manufacturing processes previously done by hand became auto-
mated due to a technological shift. This facilitated the transmission of otherwise complex information 
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 Fig. 3.14  Intra-fi rm trade and quality of contracting institutions.  Source : Authors’ calculations 
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correlation might be affected by other factors. As we will show below in a more 
 rigorous analysis, the relationship between the quality of contracting institutions and 
the mode of offshoring is not as linear as this graph suggests. 26 
 While the results presented in Figs.  3.11 ,  3.12 ,  3.13 , and  3.14 are suggestive, 
they are far from a thorough examination of the factors affecting the trade-off 
between vertical FDI and outsourcing. A more formal analysis (presented in 
Appendix B “Specifi cation for the Model of Intra-fi rm Trade”) is based on a recent 
body of empirical analyses that examine the drivers of the internalization decision 
(see Bernard et al.,  2010 ; Carluccio & Fally,  2012 ; Corcos, Delphine, Mion, & 
Verdier,  2009 ; Tomiura,  2007 ). It is worth highlighting several fi ndings from this 
analysis. First, the results show that, in general, industries that are capital intensive, 
skill intensive, and not easily contractible tend to be offshored more through vertical 
FDI, whereas labor- and unskilled-intensive industries as well as industries that are 
easily contractible are more likely to be offshored through outsourcing. Country 
characteristics also play a role. For instance, vertical FDI tends to be favored in 
countries with large physical capital endowments, large size, and adequate market 
access. These fi ndings tend to support the evidence shown in the above fi gures. 
 The second result that should be stressed is that industry characteristics and 
country factors interact—sometimes in complex ways—to determine the fi nal out-
come regarding how offshoring is carried out. We can see this in the issue of con-
tractibility. We have noted, for example, that in industries in which it is more 
complicated to set up contracts, vertical FDI is more likely to occur, and those 
industries thus exhibit higher shares of intra-fi rm trade. This is indeed the prediction 
of our econometric model, which is indicated in Fig.  3.15 by the positive slope of 
the blue line. However, as the red line of the fi gure also shows, the slope decreases 
in countries with better contracting institutions. In other words, even though vertical 
FDI is more likely to occur in industries where it is more complicated to set up 
contracts, this is less the case in countries with good governance. The reasoning is 
that multinationals can rely more on the local judicial system for compliance with 
the contracts. The result suggests that offshoring in industries susceptible to con-
tracting problems might initially take the form of vertical FDI, and as contract 
enforcement improves, local suppliers may become more involved. 27 
26
  In principle, it could be argued that the results in Fig.  3.12 support the notion developed recently 
by Antràs and Helpman ( 2008 ) that a better contracting environment in the host country reduces 
the need to outsource to incentivize foreign suppliers to comply with contracts, thus tilting the bal-
ance towards vertical integration. As mentioned in the text, however, the correlation shown in the 
fi gure can be affected by many other variables. Therefore, a proper econometric exercise, such as 
the one shown in appendix B “Specifi cation for the Model of Intra-Firm Trade”, is needed to 
isolate the particular impact of the quality of contracting institutions on intra-fi rm trade. 
27
  For industries not likely to experience contracting problems, the model predicts that the share of 
intra-fi rm trade will be higher in countries with good governance. That is, for industry contract inten-
sity below 0.2, the red line is above the blue line. But even starting from small values of contract 
intensity, it is still the case that increasing the level of contract intensity of the industry raises the share 
of intra-fi rm trade less in countries with good governance than in countries with weak governance. 
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 Policy Issues 
 We have examined some of the factors that determine why some fi rms offshore part 
of their production process to external suppliers whereas others employ affi liated 
plants. While issues related to industry characteristics (e.g., capital intensity) or 
country characteristics (e.g., factor abundance) emerged as important drivers of this 
internalization decision, perhaps the aspect that deserves most elaboration in terms 
of policy implications is the issue of contracting institutions. 
 Therefore, we now move beyond the econometric results shown earlier and dis-
cuss in more depth how contracting institutions can shape the development of global 
value chains. It is argued that different legal jurisdictions across countries could 
segment markets in much the same ways that transport costs or tariffs do (Rodrik, 
 2000 ). For example, when an agent in a country reneges on a contract involving 
residents of foreign countries, local courts may be unwilling to enforce the contract, 
especially if such enforcement would adversely affect the local resident (Antràs, 
 2014 ). Another complication is related to enforcing a contract when the party hav-
ing to pay damages does not have assets in the court’s country. In general, then, 
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 Fig. 3.15  Predicted relationship between intra-fi rm trade and contract intensity.  Source : Authors’ 
calculations.  Note : The fi gure shows the predicted relationship between intra-fi rm and contract 
intensity according to the model estimated in column 2 of Appendix B “Specifi cation for the 
Model of Intra-fi rm Trade”. In the  blue line the quality of contracting institutions takes the mean 
value of the estimated sample, while in the  red line it takes the value of the 75th percentile. All the 
other variables of the model are measured at their mean values 
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between parties of different countries, thus limiting their willingness to engage in 
cross-border production sharing. While it is true that contractual frictions can under-
mine any international transaction, they can be particularly acute for transactions in 
global supply chains because many are related to signifi cant relationship- specifi c 
investments. For instance, suppliers may customize their production to the specifi ca-
tion of particular buyers. In this case, the outside option of this production might be 
close to 0 if the buyer decides to renege on the contract. Similarly, when the supplier 
does not commit to its contractual obligations, the buyer’s investments are severely 
affected, as well as its reputation and ultimately the relationship with its own clients. 
Therefore, transactions in the global supply chain that typically entail customized 
intermediate inputs are particularly susceptible to contractual problems. 
 As mentioned earlier, fi rms might still locate slices of their value chain in coun-
tries with poor contracting institutions by establishing affi liates as a way to exercise 
more control. But even though this approach may facilitate the internal resolution of 
potential disputes, adequate contracting institutions might still be necessary. Even a 
multinational might need to resort to the legal institutions of a host country to solve 
problems with a subsidiary located there. For instance, the causes for removing a 
director of a subsidiary, contained in the bylaws of the company, might not apply to 
specifi c disputes, and thus the parent company might need to go to the local court of 
law to resolve the dispute. 28 It is also possible that the subsidiary itself might need to 
use local suppliers to conduct part of its businesses, and these local suppliers may not 
respect contracts and local courts may not enforce them; again, this situation will not 
be attractive for the multinational. Recent evidence from China supports this last 
claim. Feenstra, Hong, Ma, & Spencer ( 2012 ), for example, examine the cross-pro-
vincial variation in institutional quality in China to show that foreign fi rms located in 
China and engaged in processing trade 29 tend to export more out of provinces with 
good judicial systems. This implies that some level of contract enforcement might be 
important for enabling developing countries to join international production networks 
even when the participation takes place through foreign subsidiaries. Therefore, it is 
necessary to review the state of contracting institutions in the Latin American region. 
28
  For instance, Hong Kong technology developer CDC Corp. sued its own subsidiary, CDC 
Software Corp., in Atlanta, to block a sale of part of CDC Software businesses to another company. 
It might have taken CDC Corp. as long as 2 months to hold a meeting and exercise its right to 
remove the board members that voted to approve the potential operation, so CDC Corp. asked the 
bankruptcy court in Atlanta to issue an emergency injunction to stop the deal from progressing 
( The Wall Street Journal , 2012). Another example is the Dutch trading card company Upper Deck 
International, which fi led a lawsuit against its own Upper Deck Co. subsidiary in California, claim-
ing that by counterfeiting the Yu-Gi-Oh! card game the subsidiary cost its parent company millions 
of dollars in legal fees, lost sales, and damaged reputation (Anime News Network, 2011). 
29
  In other words, these fi rms are clearly inserted in international supply chains. 
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 Table  3.3 presents a battery of indicators that proxy the quality of contracting 
institutions for countries in Latin America as well as in other regions. The table 
shows the following variables: (1) the number of procedures for enforcing a con-
tract, (2) the time (in days) for enforcing a contract, (3) the cost (as a percentage of 
the claim) of enforcing a contract, (4) an index of legal formalism measuring the 
number of formal legal procedures necessary to resolve a simple case of collecting 
on an unpaid check, (5) an index of legal structure and security of property rights, 
(6) an index of property rights protection, (7) an index of intellectual property rights 
protection, and (8) an index of the rule of law. 30 , 31 
30
  Measures (1) to (3) come from the Doing Business dataset, measure (4) originates from the work 
by Djankov et al. ( 2003 ), and measures (5) to (8) come from the Fraser Institute, the Heritage 
Foundation, the Property Rights Alliance, and Kaufmann et al. ( 2006 ), respectively. 
31
  Measures (1) to (4) correspond to the costs of enforcing straightforward contracts; measures (5) 
to (7) address the concept of property rights, and measure (8) deals with the broader concept of the 
rule of law. Even though there might be differences between the role of contracting institutions and 
the role of property rights institutions, there are also many commonalities, since both sets of insti-
tutions relate to the protection of individuals from opportunistic behavior (Acemoglu & Johnson, 
 2005 ). As such, we include in the table the property rights measures as additional indicators that 
capture the general level of respect for existing agreements among citizens. 
 Table 3.3  Governance variables, simple average of countries in sample 
 Variable  Range  World  LAC  EU-27  Asia- Pacifi c 
 (1) No. of procedures for enforcing 
a contract 
 –  36.32  38.32  31.64  33.23 
 (2) Time for enforcing a contract, in days  –  604.14  733.28  540.76  398.92 
 (3) Cost for enforcing a contract, as % 
of claim 
 –  31.64  31.01  21.38  30.53 
 (4) Legal formalism index a  1 to 6  3.66  4.41  3.63  2.97 
 (5) Index of legal structure and security 
of property rights b 
 0 to 10  5.89  4.98  7.27  6.72 
 (6) Index of property rights b  0 to 100  49.01  45.83  70.02  52.86 
 (7) Index of protection of intellectual 
property rights b 
 0 to 10  5.48  4.51  6.85  6.23 
 (8) Rule of law index b  −2.5 to 2.5  0.05  −0.39  1.12  0.37 
 Notes : The table shows the simple average of the countries in the sample. The variables are: (1) the 
number of procedures for enforcing a contract; (2) the time (in days) for enforcing a contract; (3) 
the cost (as a percentage of the claim) of enforcing a contract from the Doing Business dataset, 
data for year 2012; (4) an index of legal formalism measuring the number of formal legal proce-
dures necessary to resolve a simple case of collecting on an unpaid check, from Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer ( 2003 ); (5) an index of legal structure and security of property 
rights, from the Fraser Institute, data for year 2012; (6) an index of property rights from the 
Heritage Foundation, data for year 2012; (7) an index of protection of intellectual property rights, 
from the Property Rights Alliance, data for year 2012; (8) an index of rule of law, from Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi,  2006 
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 Higher value corresponds to better governance outcome 
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 The table clearly indicates that Latin America has a generally subpar record in 
terms of the quality of contracting institutions, compared with other regions. 
For instance, while the average time for enforcing a contract in the Asia-Pacifi c 
countries is 398 days, the corresponding fi gure for Latin America is 733 days. 
Similarly, while the average cost (as a percentage of the claim) for enforcing a con-
tract in Europe is 21 %, the cost in Latin America is 31 %. Similar poorer perfor-
mances are seen along the property rights index and the rule of law measure. Latin 
America is outperformed even by the world average in all the variables of the table 
except for the cost of enforcing a contract. The consistency of these comparisons 
suggests that the region must improve its institutions charged with regulating 
and enforcing contractual agreements. An example closer to the ground is presented 
in Box  3 , which illustrates a case in which the issue of contractual uncertainty 
 specifi cally undermined access to international supply chains. 
 Box 3: Uncertain Contract Environments and Participation in GVCs 
 How can uncertain contract environments limit the chances of many fi rms 
from participating in global value chains? A case involving a group of 
Brazilian fi rms that started as suppliers and subcontractors of Embraer, the 
Brazilian aircraft producer, might help to answer this question. 
 Following its privatization in 1994, Embraer went through a process of 
vertical disintegration in which the fi rm focused on its core activity as a system 
integrator while outsourcing most peripheral components. This vertical disin-
tegration promoted the birth of new Brazilian fi rms that were founded mostly 
by former Embraer employees. These fi rms were typically small- and medium-
sized and participated almost exclusively as Embraer suppliers. Over time, 
however, they adopted strategies for joining the global supply chains of other 
aircraft producers and subsystem manufacturers. In the process, they received 
support from Apex, the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency. 
 Apex’s strategy was to create an export consortium among these fi rms to 
enable them to overcome two major constraints. First, many of the activities 
necessary for accessing international markets, such as participating in interna-
tional fairs, developing marketing strategies, or solving logistics weaknesses, 
entail many fi xed costs; fi rms participating in the consortium could share 
these costs. Second, in the commercial aircraft industry, aircraft producers 
tend to give preference to suppliers that can provide complete products rather 
than small parts or partial components; consortium participants could supply 
a more complex product through the complementary work of each party. 
 The consortium, called High Technology Aeronautics (HTA), consisted of 
eight small and medium enterprises. Each member paid an entrance fee and a 
monthly charge to support the consortium’s activities, and each had one vote 
in the general meetings. According to its statutes, HTA would sign a contract 




 Service Offshoring: Grasping the Intangibles 
 Chapter  2 described the increasing trend of international fragmentation of produc-
tion not only in goods but also in services. Global production networks originally 
involved the offshoring of manufactured intermediate inputs, but fi rms are also 
increasingly locating business functions abroad that were traditionally performed 
in-house. These services include computer software development, accounting, audit-
ing and bookkeeping, and database and other information services, which for the 
most part can be delivered electronically; in other words, they are intangibles. We 
also showed in Chap.  2 that the performance of Latin America in exporting some of 
 Box 3: (continued)
While the idea of the export consortium looked good on paper, it did not 
work well in practice, particularly in the area of contractual practices. 
According to Apex, Brazil does not have adequate legal provisions for regu-
lating consortia. Therefore, the agency decided that all of what they termed 
“exporting consortia” receiving its support—including HTA—should adopt 
the legal structure of a nonprofi t association. This decision became the 
Achilles’ heel of the initiative. In addition to the obvious limitation that this 
type of association cannot have profi t as its main goal, casting the HTA as a 
non-profi t association had other shortcomings. For example, the assets of the 
association could consist only of the fees paid by its members and other funds 
and donations, and the associates were not directly liable for the association’s 
obligations. In an attempt to deal with some of these weaknesses, the HTA 
decided to constitute itself as a private limited liability company, 99 % owned 
by the nonprofi t association. However, this partial remedy was not suffi cient 
to overcome the original limitations. 
 The fl aws of the HTA’s design became evident after it proved incapable of 
entering into contracts with global fi rms in the industry. For instance, after 
Pratt & Whitney, a global producer of turbines, contacted HTA, Pratt & 
Whitney decided to write a contract directly with one of the members of the 
consortium rather than with HTA. The reason was that Pratt & Whitney did 
not feel suffi ciently secure in entering into a contract with a consortium 
formed as a nonprofi t association that lacked signifi cant assets. In addition, 
Pratt & Whitney did not know at the outset the identity of the company that 
would effectively be responsible for the production of the components. 
 While this example shows the diffi culties of legally characterizing associa-
tive forms such as a consortium, it also illustrates the more general issue that 
global fi rms might be reluctant to engage in partnerships with local suppliers 
if there is uncertainty and ambiguity in contracting practices. 
 Source : based on material from Cafaggi et al. ( 2012 ) and Joppert Swensson ( 2012 ). 
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these services is on average below the norm. In this section we discuss some of the 
main factors that can improve the prospects of exporting these types of services. 
 The literature examining trade in services is quite extensive (for a general treat-
ment of the subject, see Mattoo, Stern, & Zanini,  2008 ), and the list of potential 
determinants is as varied as the type of services being offshored. For instance, coun-
tries endowed with beautiful landscapes are likely to export tourism services, while 
countries with a long history of fi nancial development are likely to export fi nancial 
services. Similar to trade in goods, a country’s comparative advantage, determined 
in part by relative endowments, can go a long way in shaping the patterns of special-
izing in exports of specifi c services (Deardorff,  1985 ). Nevertheless, a growing body 
of empirical studies indicates that at least two factors seem to be important for 
exporting a wide range of services related to GVCs: an adequate pool of human capi-
tal and a satisfactory telecommunication infrastructure that facilitates the electronic 
delivery of the services (Amin & Mattoo,  2008 ; Freund & Weinhold,  2002 ; Lennon, 
 2006 ; Lennon, Mirza, & Nicoletti,  2009 ; Mirza & Nicoletti,  2004 ; Shingal,  2010 ). 
 Figures  3.16 and  3.17 present the correlations between the exports of 
some GVC-related services and measures of human capital and telecommunication 
infrastructure, respectively. In particular, we add the exports fl ows of two service 
categories: “computer and information services” and “miscellaneous business, 
 professional, and technical services.” 32 The latter category includes services related 
32
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 Fig. 3.16  Service exports and human capital.  Source : Authors’ calculations 
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to business and knowledge process outsourcing. The measures of human capital 
and telecommunication infrastructure are the country’s tertiary education school 
enrollment and the index of information and communication technology presented 
earlier in this chapter. This preliminary evidence shows that indeed there is a posi-
tive correlation between the exports of these GVC-related services and measures of 
human capital and telecommunication infrastructure.
 However, there is considerable variation in the data, indicating that the relation-
ships between the exports of these services and the explanatory variables are not 
perfect. The reason is that other factors also affect the prospects of exporting these 
services. In what follows we perform an econometric analysis that controls for the 
impact of different determinants. The standard model in this literature is based on a 
gravity equation that relates bilateral exports of services between two countries to 
the income per capita and the size of those countries, the quality of the telecommu-
nication infrastructure in both countries, a proxy for the level of human capital in 
the exporting country, and a vector of bilateral variables that includes the distance 
between the countries and whether the countries share a common border, language, 
and colonial ties (for a summary on gravity models for trade in services, see Grover, 
Gupta, Mattoo, & Sáez,  2012 ). We follow this specifi cation in a model that also 
controls for time-invariant country and sector characteristics and also for shocks 
that may affect all the countries at the same time (for more details, see Appendix B 
“Specifi cation for the Model of Service Offshoring”). 
 The results, shown in detail in Appendix B “Specifi cation for the Model of 
Service Offshoring”, confi rm the existence of the positive relationship seen in 
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Interestingly, when we examine the role of different proxies of human capital, 
including the secondary (and tertiary) school enrollment ratio and the total number 
of pupils at the secondary level, we obtain the most robust and signifi cant relation-
ship with the last variable. This suggests that while the quality of education may be 
an important factor, this by itself might not be enough if there is not a suffi ciently 
large pool of individuals with the right skills to supply the market. This fi nding 
echoes recent analyses of, for instance, Costa Rica, which argue that even though 
the country has a good educational system, it needs to increase the quantity of 
human capital to continue thriving in the information and knowledge-intensive sec-
tors (OECD,  2012 ). 
 The second important result from the estimation is that having an adequate ICT 
infrastructure is also associated with superior performance in service exports. The 
estimation shows that good ICT is important for both the exporting and the import-
ing countries: such infrastructure facilitates not only sending but also receiving the 
information at the other end. 33 Another result worth highlighting is the role of lan-
guages. The fi ndings imply that countries sharing the same language tend to trade 
these services 30 % more than countries that do not share the same language. 
 A fi nal notable result of the estimation is the role of distances. There is a general 
notion that the growth of Internet penetration in the last two decades has allowed 
many companies to locate business functions previously performed at home in other 
countries. The results from our ICT infrastructure measure support this notion. But 
if the Internet is all that it takes to offshore business services abroad, we should not 
see any role played by distance when examining the determinants of this type of 
trade. However, the econometric results indicate that distance generates a negative 
and signifi cant impact. Other authors have found the same: physical distance reduces 
the exports of commercial services (Lennon,  2006 ) as well as fi nance, IT services, 
and miscellaneous services (Head, Mayer, & Ries,  2009 ). The study by Head et al. 
( 2009 ) is interesting because its year-by-year estimations are consistent with the 
general notion of the growing importance of the Internet and the diminishing effect 
of distance from 1996 to 2006. The authors also fi nd that the distance effect does not 
disappear entirely, but settles after the initial decline. In our own exercise, we also 
run year-by-year specifi cations similar to those in Head et al. ( 2009 ) and fi nd some 
support for the decreasing role of distance (see Fig.  3.18 ).
 The fact that distance matters implies that even though many of these services 
are provided through the Internet, they may need to be tailored to the specifi c buy-
er’s requirements and monitored for quality. Some of these activities might require 
face-to-face interactions at some point, and in general they are likely to be more 
effective if the buyer and the provider are located not too far apart. This has been 
confi rmed by other authors who have analyzed the specifi c role of Internet penetra-
tion in service trade (Freund & Weinhold,  2002 ). 
33
  Similar results are obtained in Mirza and Nicoletti ( 2004 ). 
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 Policy Issues 
 The export of certain business or knowledge-intensive services can demand specifi c 
skills that might change quickly over time. The econometric results in this section 
indicate that with respect to human capital, it is not only the quality but also the 
quantity of individuals that is important. Sustaining an adequate pool of skills can 
be challenging. Sometimes the diffi culty is education curriculums that do not pre-
pare students with the skills needed for employment in a changing labor market. In 
many cases, countries have succeeded in overcoming this problem by creating alli-
ances between the private sector, academia, and the public sector. In the Philippines, 
for example, the Technical Education and Skills Development Agency works in 
collaboration with the private sector to sustain an adequate pool of professionals in 
business process outsourcing (BPO) services. Some of the areas in which the 
agency is involved include surveys to gather information about the required skills, 
curriculum design, accreditation systems for training institutions, and funding 
of intensive training programs for college graduates who are not quite ready for 
the workforce. 
 The lack of an adequate pool of skills can also be addressed at least temporarily 
by employing foreign nationals. However, this may be diffi cult in many countries 
where stringent restrictions are imposed on the entry of professionals from other 
countries. Figure  3.19 , for example, shows a restrictiveness index for the temporal 
movement of professionals in accounting and auditing services. Even though, on 
average, Latin America compares favorably with other regions, many countries 
impose restrictions that are quite high. In general, greater liberalization of profes-
sional and technical services can be an effective way to supply capabilities required 
to serve specifi c segments of the offshore services.
 The econometric results also show that a common language plays an important 







 Fig. 3.18  Estimated impact of distance on service exports.  Source : Authors’ calculations.  Note : 
The fi gure shows the elasticities of bilateral exports of services with respect to distance, estimated 
with the negative binomial model for 3 different years (see Appendix B “Specifi cation for the 
Model of Service Offshoring”). The  vertical lines denote the 95 % confi dence intervals 
 













 Fig. 3.19  Restrictiveness index for trade in accounting and auditing services, 2008.  Source : 
Authors’ calculations based on the Services Trade Restrictions Database (WB).  Note : The fi gure 
shows the service trade restriction index for trade in accounting and auditing services. The index 
goes from 0 to 100, with higher values representing higher restrictions 
challenge for many countries in Latin America, particularly for services aimed at 
the North American market. For instance, there is a growing Spanish-speaking mar-
ket in the US, with a traditional demand for “call center” services, but which could 
eventually require IT and specialized business services as well. This is clearly an 
opportunity. However, the largest market in the US will continue to be the English- 
speaking segment, and the results from the model imply the importance of develop-
ing profi ciency in English if this segment is to be targeted. 
 The fact that proximity plays a signifi cant role in the provision of many services 
gives Latin America an edge relative to distant countries in Asia or Europe in targeting 
the US market. The region’s advantages are particularly signifi cant for exporting busi-
ness functions that might require similar time zones or involve specifi c customization 
to the client’s needs, and for which proximity is an important factor. Box  4 presents two 
examples in Latin America of fi rms specialized in exporting customized IT services to 
the US; in both cases, proximity to clients clearly contributed to their success. 
 Finally, it has been noted that the countries in Latin America should coordinate 
efforts to attract more offshore services to the region to encourage potential clients 
to identify the region as a favorable hub for offshoring (Gereffi , Castillo, & 
Fernandez-Stark,  2009 ). Greater collaboration across the region might take the form 
of cross-fertilization of experiences and ideas, as well as cooperation in disseminat-




 Box 4: Exporting Customized IT Services 
 It has been well documented that when a product specifi cation cannot be eas-
ily codifi ed (for instance, because the product requires customized features), 
the buyer and supplier engage in frequent face-to-face interactions and high 
levels of explicit coordination to ensure that the relevant information is prop-
erly transmitted (Gereffi  et al.,  2005 ). This is the case not only in manufactur-
ing but also in services. Following are two examples of fi rms in Latin America 
that had an advantage in exporting customized IT services to the US because 
proximity facilitated the transmission of such knowledge between the clients 
and the providers. 
 Avionix. Embedded software integrates systems from third-party electronics 
components. In the aeronautics industry this software can be very sophisticated 
and tends to be customized to a product’s particular specifi cations. For example, 
the new Boeing 787 Dreamliner requires about 6.5 million lines of tailor-made 
software code for the plane’s avionic and onboard support systems. 
 In 1998, Avionix opened its fi rst engineering facility in Melbourne, Florida, 
to develop avionic embedded software. In 2004, the fi rm opened a second 
engineering facility in San Jose, Costa Rica. Over the next 3 years, all the 
engineering operations were moved to the Costa Rica facility. Avionix has 
completed projects for virtually every aircraft subsystem, including naviga-
tion, weather/traffi c/terrain surveillance, communication, fl ight control, cock-
pit displays, etc. The main clients of Avionix are in the US, for which the fi rm 
develops software customized to the client’s specifi cations in a process that 
requires a continuous fl ow of communication between Avionix and the client. 
 According to the company, Costa Rica offers important advantages over 
other major IT offshoring destinations, such as India. The advantages are 
most signifi cant for the development of customized software for clients 
located in the US. For instance, a similar time zone with the US is very impor-
tant for arranging weekly teleconference status meetings, which are necessary 
to meet coordination needs. 
 Proximity is critical for other reasons as well. For example, unlike PC or 
Web development projects, hardware containing the embedded project is gen-
erally developed in parallel with the software. This requires a great deal of 
communication with the client. Also, multiple revisions of the hardware may 
need to be shipped offshore to the supplier to support the development of the 
software, and proximity helps to keep these shipping costs low relative to the 
more distant competitors, such as India. 
 Softek. There is a growing trend for outsourcing IT services for functions 
ranging from software development to monitoring and managing a company’s 
IT systems, including website creation, database analysis, data storage, 
and testing.
(continued) 
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 Box 4: (continued)
The Mexican fi rm Softek provides a wide range of IT services, including 
application- related services, software testing, server and datacom services, 
and procurement services. While the company’s initial clients were located in 
Latin America, Softek ventured into the US market after realizing the critical 
importance of proximity to customers in need of swift solutions to business 
problems. 
 According to the company, geographic proximity is particularly important 
for scoping projects and assessing clients’ needs. The company targets a mar-
ket niche of tailor-made software applications and IT services that require 
direct, agile, and constant communications with the client. The fi rm’s location 
in Mexico qualifi es it for NAFTA’s short-term visas, which facilitate quick 
trips to the US. Such fl exibility and agility to respond to client needs is not 
necessarily offered by large software producers in distant countries, such 
as India or China. By differentiating its products, targeting the tailor-made 
software market, and using proximity to its advantage, Softek avoids direct 
price competition with its counterparts in Asia. 
 These examples illustrate how the region can successfully compete with 
lower- cost IT offshoring destinations in Asia by exploiting segments of the 
offshore services in which there are clear comparative advantages, such as in 
the tailor-made and customized solutions. These are products in which the 
exchange of tacit information between the buyer and the supplier requires 
frequent face-to-face interactions as well as a great deal of coordination. 
Similar time zones and geographic proximity provide a natural competitive 
edge for delivering these services. 
 Sources : the example of Avionix is based on material from Monge-Gonzalez 
and Zolezzi ( 2012 ). The case of Softek is based on material from Brown-
Grossman and Domínguez-Villalobos ( 2012 ). 
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